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I. INTRODUCTION
India, a highly diverse society, is an endangered 
pluralist polity. An early adopter of a constitutional 
framework that recognized group-differentiated 
rights, India is now challenged by forces that 
threaten its fragile political consensus. This paper 
is divided into four sections. The first section 
offers an overview of India’s diversity, state forms 
and nationalisms in broad brushstrokes. The 
second focuses on a particular change experience: 
constitution-making in India (1946–49). The Indian 
Constitution’s adoption of group-differentiated 
rights in 1950 presaged multiculturalism in some 
respects. However, despite a range of group rights, 
including quotas for Untouchable and tribal groups, 
and self-government rights for linguistic groups, a 
normative deficit remained in India’s constitutional 
framework with respect to the protection of 
minority cultures. Shifting to the present, the third 
section discusses sources of inclusion and exclusion 
in the Indian polity. Focusing on reservations, 
discrimination against Muslims, Hindu nationalism 
and violence, it outlines key dimensions of exclusion 
in India today. The final section summarizes key 
lessons from the Indian experience with pluralism.1
II. ORIGINS AND RESPONSES
TO DIVERSITY: PEOPLES, 
STATE, NATION 
India’s Diversity 
In comparative terms, India’s demographic diversity 
is significant in at least two respects. First, it offers 
an example of extensive cross-cutting diversity 
along the lines of religion, language, caste and 
tribe. Hindus form a majority of the population, 
around 79.8% out of a total of 1.21 billion.2 With 
around 180 million Muslims (approximately 14.2% 
of the population), India is also the third-largest 
Muslim country in the world, due to become the 
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largest Muslim country by 2050. The population 
of India’s other major religious communities is: 
Christian 2.3%, Sikh 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7% and 
Jain 0.4%. However, the followers of each religion 
speak different languages and belong to a variety 
of sects, castes and tribes. In terms of language, 
there are some 22 official languages and 122 major 
languages listed in the census.3 Hindi speakers 
constituted 41% of the population, followed by 
Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil and Urdu speakers, 
each constituting more than 5% of the population. 
Religious and caste divisions have been of enduring 
significance in national politics, with linguistic 
divisions becoming less contentious since the 
1950s.4
Second, India’s diversity is long-standing and 
not a product of recent migration. Unlike in most 
Western democracies, the rights of immigrants 
have not been central to debates on pluralism in 
India. India’s different religious, linguistic and 
tribal groups are all national minorities of one kind 
or another.5 It is true that Islam and Christianity 
are viewed by many Hindu nationalists as foreign 
religions, unlike Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism, 
which are regarded as the progeny of Hinduism and 
indigenous to Indian soil. Nevertheless, with some 
of the oldest Muslim and Christian communities 
in the world,6 and with most followers of Islam 
and Christianity seen as converts from Hinduism, 
religious minorities are not viewed as recent 
migrants, unlike in Europe and North America. The 
rights of migrant minorities have been a contentious 
issue mainly at the sub-national level, with sons-of-
the-soil movements against migrants influential in 
some provinces (notably Assam).
With cross-cutting and long-standing patterns 
of diversity, which groups are to be considered 
India’s minorities is not straightforward.7 In 
national politics, the term has, for the most 
part, denoted religious minorities, particularly 
Muslims. In late colonial India, other groups 
claiming special representation (notably Dalits) 
also called themselves a minority, although during 
constitution-making attempts were made to restrict 
the term’s use.8 In numerical terms, as well as with 
regard to marginalized status, Dalits or Scheduled 
Castes (SC, approximately 16.6%) and tribal groups 
or Scheduled Tribes (ST, approximate 8.6%) are also 
minorities. At the sub-national level, the majority 
Hindus are a numerical minority in some states. 
In Hindu nationalist accounts, Hindus are often 
described as a besieged minority in a part of the 
world dominated by Muslims.9 Hindu nationalism 
in India, like Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in Sri 
Lanka, reflects a “minority complex,”10 a sense that 
the majority religion is not getting its due share 
of recognition and resources from the state. With 
regards to language, the speakers of the majority 
language Hindi (the Indian Constitution does not 
designate a single national language), as well as 
each of the 22 official languages (each state can 
choose its official language) constitute a minority 
in some provinces. As such, depending on the unit 
of analysis, there is hardly any group that lacks a 
claim to minority status. In caste terms, the official 
category Other Backward Classes (OBC), comprising 
several intermediate lower castes, constitutes a 
majority, nearly 44% of the population according 
to many estimates (based on the last caste census 
of 1931). Upper castes, including Brahmins and 
other dominant castes, constitute around 16%, a 
numerical minority.11
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State Forms and Pluralism
Historical legacies of state formation in India 
favour a pluralist polity. In contrast with the 
history of European state formation, which saw 
the centralization of power and sovereignty, 
in pre-colonial India sub-continental empires 
competed with regional kingdoms as state forms.12 
Sub-continental empires that extended across 
much of Indian territory date back to the Mauryan 
empire of the fourth century, and include the 
Mughal and British empires between the 16th 
and 20th centuries. These were constrained from 
within by forms of indirect rule (e.g., the Princely 
States under British rule) and from without by 
regional kingdoms. Across varied forms, under 
both indigenous and foreign rulers, state power 
in India remained limited in its reach. The 
segmented and constrained nature of state power 
was not just a pragmatic concession to the power 
of local chieftains according to scholars, but also a 
principle derived from Hindu religious legal texts 
(dharmasastras).13 A society consisting of different 
social groups was seen as prior to the state and 
independent of it. The rulers’ duty was to protect 
and uphold the respective customs and laws of self-
regulating social groups.14
Segmented and constrained forms of state power 
have favoured the accommodation of societal 
pluralism in several respects. The precedence of 
the moral order of society implied that the state 
would not seek to impose its preferred vision 
throughout society, but would respect the internal 
rules and practices of social groups so long as taxes 
and revenues were paid.15 Furthermore, the social 
order was compartmentalized, which meant that 
communities could share “a sense of brotherhood 
within themselves,” but “were not united to each 
other by fellow feeling,” even though they were 
not antagonistic with each other.16 External groups 
could be incorporated into this segmentary social 
order by creating a circle of their own, which 
existed not so much in open communication with 
the rest, but in a “back-to-back adjacency.”17 The 
caste system epitomized this order of self-regulating 
groups, embodying a principle of asymmetric 
hierarchy, i.e., a group that was at the top in terms 
of ritual status might be at the middle or bottom 
in terms of the distribution of political power and 
economic holdings in a region. A social order that 
was stratified along multiple axes made for greater 
intra-group diversity than in systems based on 
a symmetrical hierarchy, but also enabled the 
endurance of inequality, making it “cognitively more 
difficult to identify the structure of dominance.”18  
In sum, long-term trajectories of state forms 
in India have supported the accommodation of 
diversity, but within an order defined by hierarchy 
and inequality, what might be termed hierarchical 
or segmented pluralism.  
Indian Nationalisms: Hindu and Secular
Indian nationalisms that emerged in the late 19th 
century had to contend at the outset with the claim 
that India’s diversities meant that it was not a 
nation. Broadly speaking, two main responses can 
be discerned to the challenge posed by cultural 
diversity to Indian unity. The first sought to unify 
India’s diversities around a core of Hindu religion 
and culture, defining India’s national identity as 
fundamentally Hindu. Hindu nationalism emerged 
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from late-19th-century movements of Hindu reform. 
The formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS), the nucleus of Hindu nationalism (1925), was 
a response to the sense of cultural inferiority that 
came with colonialism,19 and also to the perceived 
threat of aggressive pan-Islamism from the Khilafat 
movement.20 RSS ideologues sought to establish 
that Hindus were a nation in the Western sense, a 
people descended from the Aryans, with an ancient 
tradition that dated back to the Vedic era, inhabiting 
a clearly demarcated territory that extended from 
the Himalayas to the sea, and a common language, 
Sanskrit, “the mother of all languages.” India, it was 
argued, had succumbed to Muslim and Christian 
invaders repeatedly because Hindus were divided, 
weak and effeminate. It was the nationalists’ duty 
to restore the lost “grandeur of Hindu culture and 
their supremacy over a land that had been invaded 
by foreigners” through fashioning a more muscular, 
disciplined and masculine Hindu identity.21 In 
particular, the restoration of India’s lost greatness 
required the rectification of Muslim conquest, a 
process that was accompanied by a demonization 
of Muslims as a separate people.22 V.D. Savarkar’s 
influential Hindutva (1923), regarded as Hindu 
nationalism’s foundational text, located Indian 
identity in Hindu civilization (sanskriti) and defined 
a Hindu as a person who regards India as their 
father-land as well as holy-land—an influential 
definition that included members of Indic religions 
(Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs), but excluded Muslims 
and Christians. Politically, Hindu nationalism was 
overtaken and, to an extent, subsumed within the 
Congress-led movement for Indian independence, 
where leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawarhalal Nehru held it in check. Nevertheless, 
Hindu nationalism has remained a powerful 
undertow throughout India’s political history 
against which all other political forces have had to 
define themselves.23
A second response to the national question that was 
politically dominant at the time of independence, 
held that cultural diversity was India’s 
distinguishing trait, and a source of strength rather 
than a weakness. The leaders of the Indian National 
Congress (henceforth Congress, formed in 1885)24 
rejected dominant Western models of nation-
building based on commonness of language and 
culture, arguing instead for a “unity in diversity.” 
What a shared Indian identity consisted of, beyond 
a history of co-existence of diverse communities 
in the same territory and a few similar cultural 
norms, remained nebulous. There remained a 
strong tendency, even in secular Indian nationalists 
such as Nehru, to “assume some kind of cultural or 
civilizational integration as the ultimate foundation 
of nationalism.”25 Until around the 1920s, the nation 
was depicted mostly in communitarian terms, as a 
composite of various religious, regional and caste 
communities, with conceptions of the nation that 
emphasized the individual citizen as their unit 
becoming prominent after the 1920s.26 In political 
terms, a shared history of struggle against British 
rule in India was central to narratives of Indian 
unity, as was a commitment to inclusive citizenship, 
expressed in the slogan “irrespective of caste, creed 
or colour.” Against the British claim that India was 
an assortment of quarrelling nationalities kept 
together only by the exercise of imperial power, 
the nationalist narrative asserted that communal 
discord was not inherent to India, but a product of 
a deliberate colonial “divide and rule” strategy. Was 
the ideological consensus on inclusive citizenship 
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at the time of Indian independence only an elite 
consensus, restricted to a few leaders such as 
Gandhi and Nehru? It is hard to know the extent to 
which the thousands of ordinary people who took 
part in the national movement shared its ideals, 
although participation meant that these came to be 
shared to an extent by a widening section of elites.
How did such a diverse people come to seek 
belonging to the same nation-state, given that 
“before the 19th century, no residents of the 
subcontinent would have identified themselves as 
Indian”?27 Participation in a common struggle for 
independence from British rule helps to explain 
this to some extent, although several missing links 
still remain. The following factors are relevant. The 
Indian national movement was a loose federation 
of many different anti-colonial struggles. The kind 
of state that would emerge after independence 
remained open until after Partition and the creation 
of Pakistan in 1947.28 The ambiguity over whether 
an Indian state would be a loose federation for 
instance, and what the nature of allegiance of the 
hundreds of Princely States would be, helped accrue 
support for its cause. Further, in India, “a sense 
of region and nation emerged together” such that 
being Bengali, or Marathi or Tamil-speaking, was 
congruent with an Indian identity from the start.29 
The Congress party recognized language-based 
units in its internal organization from the early 20th 
century, and more comprehensively from 1920,30 
as a more rational basis of provincial organization 
than British administrative boundaries. Finally, 
the national movement’s leadership facilitated the 
accommodation of diverse, even opposed views. 
Congress resolutions and decisions were often 
adopted after robust debate, with many members 
voting publicly against resolutions favoured by 
leaders such as Gandhi.31 Nationalist campaigns 
against British rule often focused on the extension 
of civil and political liberties enjoyed by Britons to 
Indians, fostering a political culture of dissent. The 
accommodationist character of the Congress-led 
national movement likely enabled the identification 
of a diverse people with the nationalist cause.
The Congress-led national movement was, 
however, more successful in accommodating 
linguistic diversity than religious differences. 
The Congress leadership conceived of the Indian 
nation as multi-religious. From the 1930s, its 
official pronouncements favoured a secular 
state and individual rights to religious freedom 
and non-discrimination as mechanisms for the 
accommodation of religious diversity. Earlier, 
the Congress party had recognized religious 
communities—at various points, it accepted 
separate electorates for Muslims, reserved seats in 
proportion to their population for religious groups, 
as well as minority veto in some form.32 However, its 
claim to represent all sections of the Indian nation 
meant that the Congress was increasingly hostile to 
demands for separate representation of minorities 
and mechanisms of power-sharing, holding that 
these were colonial devices to divide and rule. 
By the time of independence in 1947, when the 
Constitution of India was being framed, the choice 
was between two alternative visions of the nation—
political and cultural.33 For secular nationalists 
such as Nehru, nationality was to consist in secular 
citizenship, with nation conceived mostly in political 
terms, as a community united by its commitment to 
common ideals such as secularism and democracy. 
6     Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism
Why did India Choose Pluralism? 
Becoming Indian involved learning to put belonging 
to India above belonging to any religious, linguistic, 
caste or tribal group. By contrast, for Hindu 
nationalists, India’s national identity was defined 
in cultural terms as discussed, based typically on 
descent from Indic religions such as Hinduism 
and Sikhism. In this definition of the national 
identity, the accommodation of diversity rested on 
accepting the pre-eminence of Hindu culture, and 
to an extent Hindi as the national language. India’s 
constitutional framework mostly expresses a secular 
national identity although it contains some elements 
of Hindu nationalism as well.34
II. CONSTITUTION-MAKING, 
1946–49: A PIVOT POINT 
FOR INDIAN PLURALISM
What Accounts for India’s Pluralist 
Constitution? 
The Indian Constitution is accommodationist 
with respect to diversity along the axes of 
religion, caste, tribe and language, although 
differentially so. It was ahead of its time 
in instituting cultural rights for minorities 
and affirmative action for historically 
disadvantaged groups within a broadly liberal 
democratic framework. Group rights in the 
Indian Constitution include legal pluralism 
in religious family law (Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians, Parsis), affirmative action 
including quotas (known as reservations in 
India) in legislatures, government jobs and 
educational institutions for lower caste and 
tribal groups, as well as self-government 
rights for linguistic and tribal groups. 
As such, many features of India’s 1950 
Constitution presage multiculturalism in 
Western democracies.35
What accounts for India’s accommodationist 
constitution? As a post-colonial nation-state 
that was undergoing a bitter partition along 
religious lines at the time of constitution-
making, it was not inevitable that India 
would adopt a constitution with multicultural 
type provisions. To begin with, historical 
legacies favoured group rights. From the 
late 18th century, East India Company 
administrators sought to exempt parts of 
religious law (pertaining to family law, 
caste and religious endowments) from the 
purview of their regulatory action.36 Group-
based representation in colonial legislatures 
dates back to the late 19th century, with 
Indians included in the representative 
institutions of the Raj as members of 
particular groups.37 Different mechanisms of 
group representation came to be instituted 
including separate electorates, reserved 
seats, weightage (guaranteed representation 
for minorities in excess of their enumerated 
demographic share) and nomination.38
While such long-standing antecedents 
favoured multicultural provisions, there were 
also factors that went against their adoption. 
India’s bloody partition along religious 
lines that unfolded during constitution-
making was regarded by the Congress as the 
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outcome of colonial policies such as separate 
electorates for Muslims. The Congress was 
numerically dominant in the Constituent 
Assembly, and after Partition its majority 
rose to 82%.39 Partition had weakened 
minorities in strategic and organizational 
terms, as well as numerically, and also 
hardened the public mood against minority 
demands.40 The Congress no longer needed 
to conciliate minority parties in order to avert 
Partition. It also faced stronger pressures 
from its Hindu nationalist members opposed 
to concessions to minorities.41 In addition, 
several obstacles that face the adoption of 
multicultural policies in other post-colonial 
contexts could be observed in the Indian 
case as well. These included the association 
of minority protections with colonial divide 
and rule, and the view that minorities were 
a potential “fifth column”—a threat to the 
security of the state on account of loyalty to a 
rival neighbouring state.42 
In the end, short-term factors weighing 
against the adoption of group rights in 
the Indian Constitution were unable to 
overwhelm the longer-term legacies that 
favoured accommodation. Constitutional 
outcomes varied across different policy areas. 
In the case of religious minorities, separate 
electorates, and legislative and employment 
quotas (termed “political safeguards” or 
“reservations”) were abolished. These 
were retained for ex-Untouchables and 
tribals—Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) in official usage—as 
temporary affirmative action provisions. 
The Constitution inaugurated a shift from 
consociationalism to affirmative action as the 
overarching framework for quotas. Provisions 
for cultural protection were retained in the 
form of religious family laws for instance, 
and territorial autonomy for tribal groups. 
Overall, the constitutional position on group 
rights represented a cutback on colonial 
constitutionalism, but was also distinct 
from the assimilationist positions espoused 
by Hindu nationalists in the Constituent 
Assembly.43 
Several factors enabled the retention of 
group-differentiated rights, albeit within an 
altered framework. The Congress party had 
made public commitments to the protection 
of minorities through fundamental rights, as 
well as reservations for Untouchables. It also 
had a long-standing commitment to non-
majoritarian decision-making. The presence 
in key power positions of political actors 
with a staunch commitment to the rights of 
minorities and historically disadvantaged 
groups, such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru and the chair of the Drafting 
Committee Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, prevented 
the withdrawal of group rights in the face 
of Partition and anti-minority sentiment. 
Finally, the ideological legacy of India’s 
national movement—its commitment to a 
plural and egalitarian polity—meant that a 
normative vocabulary was fashioned in which 
some group-differentiated provisions were 
legitimate. 
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Constitutional Approaches to Group 
Rights: Integrationist and Restricted 
Multicultural 
The normative vocabulary of Indian 
nationalism comprised a constellation of 
inter-related concepts: secularism, equal 
citizenship rights, democracy, social justice, 
development and national unity.44 While most 
Congress members, including Nehru, felt that 
group quotas detracted from these ideals, it 
was argued that these were necessary for a 
short period in the Indian context, for the 
sake of the goals of social justice, national 
unity and development, in the case of the 
ex-Untouchable and tribal groups. With 
national development for instance, “catching 
up” with the industrialized Western world 
was the desired goal; quotas and other special 
provisions, it was argued, were needed 
for some time for those sections of the 
population “whose present backwardness is 
only a hindrance to the rapid development 
of the country.”45 Whereas the inclusion of 
legislative quotas for Untouchable and tribal 
groups was facilitated by the fashioning 
of normative resources in support of such 
provisions, in the case of religious minorities, 
comparable resources were not fashioned in 
any strand of nationalist opinion.46
Quotas in the case of ex-Untouchables and 
tribal groups were accommodated in the Indian 
Constitution as integrationist mechanisms rather 
than as multicultural rights. Legislative quotas for 
Dalits and Adivasis were not intended to serve as a 
form of representation as such, but were recast as a 
temporary form of  “political’ affirmative action.”47 
These were not intended as a means of recognizing 
group identity, or as instruments of self-government 
for the SCs and STs. Secular nationalists were 
hostile to the recognition of religious and caste 
groups as units of state policy.
On the other hand, with respect to policies of 
autonomy for religious, tribal and linguistic groups, 
the Constitutional approach might be described as 
“restricted  multicultural.”48 During the framing 
of the Constitution, despite the opposition of 
both Hindu nationalists and staunch secularists, 
a broad definition of the right to religious 
freedom was adopted, which included the right to 
practise religion in public spaces and, even more 
controversially, the right to “propagate” religion. 
Further, unlike many secular constitutions, the 
Indian Constitution recognizes the associational 
and institutional autonomy of religious groups. 
Every religious group has the right to establish and 
maintain institutions for religious and charitable 
purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters 
of religion, and to own, acquire and administer 
property in accordance with law (Articles 25, 26 
of the Indian Constitution). Also in keeping with 
the concerns of many minority representatives, 
separate religious family laws for Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians and Parsis were retained. However, the 
overall approach in the area of religious freedom 
remained weak multicultural. Thus, the right to 
freedom of religion is subject to other constitutional 
rights including those of equality and non-
discrimination. State intervention is permitted not 
just in the interests of public order, morality and 
health as common elsewhere, but also for purposes 
of social welfare and reform. In keeping with the 
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demand of many secularists and Hindu nationalists, 
the non-justiciable Directive Principles include a 
provision for a uniform civil code. 
According to many liberal theorists, a weak 
multicultural approach is better than strong 
multiculturalism, as it offers better protections for 
individuals and vulnerable groups within minorities, 
such as women.49 In the case of the Indian 
Constitution, the problem was not with its approach 
as with the normative resources fashioned, which 
remained deficient for the accommodation of 
religious diversity. 
The Normative Deficit of Weak 
Multiculturalism 
The repertoire of secular Indian nationalism did 
contain materials supporting weak multiculturalism. 
Thus, in a departure from the standard liberal 
position, groups were recognized as subjects of 
rights and entitlements, as well as individuals.50 
In most connotations of secularism in nationalist 
discourse, the preservation of religion, language and 
culture on the part of citizens individually, and as 
associations, were valued pursuits.51 Nevertheless, 
justifications for weak multicultural provisions 
remained under-developed in nationalist opinion 
because of multiple factors. Prominent among these 
was the emphasis on individual over group rights in 
this period, driven by concerns regarding national 
unity. Equal citizenship, construed as the same 
rights for individuals from all groups, provided 
a means for welding together a people divided 
by their group membership into a nation. It also 
provided the basis for a common national identity in 
a situation in which ethnic criteria were divisive.52
The normative deficit of weak multiculturalism 
also derived from the fact that the move from all 
groups having rights to pursue their culture to the 
differential rights of minority cultures remained 
unarticulated. It is hard to find any elaboration 
in nationalist opinion on how the protection of 
minority cultures formed part of their vision of 
the common good. In particular, unlike in the 
case of SCs and STs, there were no attempts to go 
beyond formal symmetrical notions of equality to 
substantive, contextual notions that could justify 
special provisions for minorities. There were, 
for instance, no arguments along the lines that 
minorities faced a greater threat to the integrity of 
their religion, language or culture than the majority, 
whose practices are inevitably supported by society 
and the state.53
The normative deficit in nationalist discourse with 
regard to the protection of cultural difference is 
also observable in the case of tribal groups. The 
need for the protection of tribal lands was qualified 
in important respects. As a developmentalist 
perspective dominated, progressive change 
in Adivasi cultures in the direction of greater 
integration with mainstream society was not ruled 
out. Furthermore, protectionist policies such as land 
rights and tribal councils were envisaged mainly 
for areas where tribal populations formed a local 
majority in a given territory. For areas in which 
tribal groups were a minority, cultural protection 
was rarely admitted as a goal.
Territorial self-government is often seen as the 
paradigmatic form of multiculturalism, as a means 
to constrain the dominance of the majority language 
that is supported through its use by the state. In 
the Indian case as discussed, the dominance of 
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the majority Hindi language was limited from 
the start. While there were pressures for the 
adoption of Hindi as a national language during 
constitution-making, these were opposed from 
within the majority party by non-Hindi speakers 
and ultimately a compromise formula was adopted. 
Hindi in the Devanagari script was designated as 
an official language, to be used for “inter-provincial 
communication.”54 However, English would also 
continue as an official link language, initially for 15 
years, extended since. Also, 14 regional languages 
were listed in the Constitution as official languages 
entitled to receive state support and to be used in 
public service examinations.55
Furthermore, the Indian case suggests that 
territorial self-government policies are not 
necessarily instances of group-differentiated rights 
or minority rights.56 During constitution-making, all 
units within the federation were granted the same 
rights.57 Constitution-makers declined to specify 
the basis for the definition of federal units, i.e., 
whether this would be on linguistic lines, despite 
pressures to do so. Though the many proponents 
of linguistic provinces in the Constituent Assembly 
pressed their case, they did not consider themselves 
separatists, in contrast to the conflict between 
“centralizers” and “provincialists” in the US and 
Canada.58 The delineation of sub-national units 
from the 1950s onwards, occurred as a result of a 
political process involving contentious mobilization. 
Finally, in practice, self-government rights for states 
in India have often been in conflict with the rights 
of religious, tribal and linguistic minorities. The 
protection of minorities in India was an important 
consideration against strengthening the rights of 
states relative to the central government.59
 The normative deficit of multicultural minority 
rights at India’s founding moment has been 
politically influential. Despite the changed 
circumstances since 1947, subsequent generations 
of policy-makers have not been able to elaborate 
or robustly defend and disseminate a vision of 
multicultural minority rights (as distinct from group 
rights in general). Although group-differentiated 
rights have expanded in several areas, a lack of 
elaboration of their rationale through public debate 
and, in terms of their society-wide benefits, has left 
minorities vulnerable to resentment and backlash, 
as witnessed in the current dominance of the Hindu 
Right.
III. DRIVERS OF PLURALISM
Sources of Inclusion
The Constitution and institutions
 
The Indian Constitution, despite its flaws, remains 
a key source of inclusion in the polity. It endures 
and continues to elicit a high level of support from 
across the political spectrum, including from critics 
seeking political change. While its substantive 
pluralist provisions discussed above remain under-
fulfilled in some areas such as religious freedom, 
their articulation in the Constitution has created 
standards for inclusion against which actions can be 
assessed and challenged. 
The judiciary have been sources of inclusion, with 
powers to review legislative and executive actions 
for their constitutionality, and regular elections 
to elect governments overseen by an independent 
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Election Commission. Institutional heterogeneity 
in the political system, with a tension between 
parliamentary sovereignty on the one hand, and 
judicial review on the other, has also been a source 
of inclusion. The higher judiciary in particular has 
often asserted itself as the main guardian of the 
Constitution to compensate for its unelected status, 
frequently challenging the actions of governments 
and issuing reprimands for their behaviour.60 
The ambiguity regarding who the final authority is 
on the Constitution acts as a source of inclusion, 
with claimants disappointed by the decision of one 
institution able to petition another.
 
A federal division of powers between the national 
and regional governments (“centre” and “states”), 
with significant powers vested in states (including 
education and health), has served as a source of 
inclusion. A flexible federal framework has allowed 
for the recognition of demands for autonomy by 
linguistic and tribal groups through a redrawing of 
state boundaries over time.61 Periodic conflicts and 
violence have been contained in particular regions, 
while life elsewhere continues as usual.62 In this, 
federalism has been helped by the nature of India’s 
social diversity that is grouped around multiple 
axes and dispersed, rather than centripetal.63 
This has prevented the emergence of a single 
enduring country-wide cleavage that threatens the 
centre, unlike in other countries. A federal system 
underpinned by cross-cutting social diversity 
has offered opportunities for the expression and 
accommodation of demands arising from multiple 
sources of exclusion.
Political parties and elections 
Political parties and elections have also served as 
sources of inclusion. Political parties, for the most 
part, have been multi-ethnic and have offered 
avenues for the inclusion of minorities through, 
for instance, key positions in party organizations. 
Politicians have facilitated a politics of bargaining 
and compromise between different social interests. 
Furthermore, the plenitude of largely free elections 
at all levels allows groups that are under-included 
in one instance to contest again soon at another 
level. The large number of parties competing for 
votes in multiple electoral arenas has meant that 
in seeking to craft winning electoral coalitions, 
parties have often sought to court groups beyond 
their core supporters, thereby offering opportunities 
for inclusion. In elected institutions at the 
central, provincial, district and village levels, the 
representation of lower castes has been increasing. 
The fairness of elections has been maintained by 
an election commission and a judiciary that derive 
their legitimacy from their independence from 
the executive. On several occasions, the processes 
of electoral and party competition have also been 
exclusionary, with electoral appeals by political 
parties seeking to build electoral majorities of 
Hindus against Muslims, “backward castes” against 
forward castes, Maharashtrians or Assamese against 
outsiders, for instance. Nevertheless, overall, the 
working of the Constitution through the party 
system and elections has offered “great resources of 
self-correction.”64
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Civil society
In addition to political institutions, civil society 
organizations and a free press have been a source of 
inclusion in the polity. Critical yet engaged in their 
stance towards government, and multi-ethnic in 
their membership, these have served to highlight 
violations of the rights of vulnerable groups and 
to hold state agencies accountable through courts, 
street protests, television and newspaper debates. 
Unlike in some other countries, human rights are 
not seen as an external, Western imposition, in part 
because of a large sector of local rights organizations 
closely engaged with grassroots struggles to protect 
the constitutional framework of rights. Occasionally, 
civil society organizations have acted in partnership 
with the state to design inclusionary legislation 
and administrative processes; for instance, in the 
enactment of a Right to Information Act and a Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act that is the world’s 
largest poverty alleviation program.65 A relatively 
free press, with several 24-hour news channels 
competing over headlines and exclusive reports, has 
also served to highlight the violations of rights by 
political leaders and governments. 
Finally, radical social movements as well as a 
critical intelligentsia have been important sources 
of inclusion. Intellectuals have sought to be the 
voice of the vulnerable and played a leading role in 
recent protests against the killings and harassment 
of critics of Hindu nationalism and police action 
on student campuses.66 While Hindu nationalists 
have waged counter-campaigns of hate and 
disinformation through social media platforms, 
social movements and intellectuals have served to 
highlight the abuses of state power and to forge 
solidarities across identity groups. 
Sources of Exclusion 
Notwithstanding the sources of inclusion discussed 
above, substantial exclusions remain both in the 
Indian polity, and the society and economy more 
broadly. Three key domains of exclusion are 
discussed below. 
Exclusions of an inclusionary policy: Reservations 
for disadvantaged groups
Although the policy of quotas has enabled the 
inclusion of ex-Untouchable and tribal groups in 
legislatures, employment and educational quotas 
remain under-filled at higher levels.67 The reasons 
for this include the lack of educational and training 
programs to create a pool of qualified candidates, 
and the gross neglect of public education by 
central and state governments, on which the 
disadvantaged are disproportionately reliant. In 
turn, the preponderance of marginalized groups in 
lower level government jobs (e.g., Dalits as janitors), 
serves to reinforce their historical associations 
with stigmatized occupations. Furthermore, in 
the private sector, which is outside the purview of 
reservation policies, the under-representation and 
economic discrimination of Dalits and Adivasis is 
much greater. Caste diversity hardly exists in the 
boards of corporate firms and in national media 
houses.68
In India as elsewhere, quotas create resentment 
against beneficiary groups. Sub-categorization 
movements have demanded the targeting of 
benefits towards the more deprived sub-castes (e.g., 
Madigas in Andhra Pradesh), suggesting resentment 
against a policy seen to favour well-to-do Dalits 
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and Adivasis. Under-filled quotas in government 
employment have created staff shortages in 
some public universities and civil service sectors, 
intensifying the pressures on existing staff and 
reducing capacity in the public sector. Mobilization 
by prosperous, educationally disadvantaged groups 
(e.g., Jats, Patidars) for “backward” status and 
inclusion in quotas, threatens to undermine support 
for the policy more generally. Governments have 
tended to given in to demands for reservations 
from electorally powerful groups. Demands to 
include economically deprived upper-castes within 
the ambit of quotas suggest that their costs have 
been borne by weaker members of non-beneficiary 
groups, making these, as Marc Galanter puts it, a 
“costly success.”69
Unlike the ST and OBC categories that are religion-
neutral, the SC category excludes Muslims and 
Christians. Ostensibly on grounds that Islam 
and Christianity do not recognize untouchability, 
this was a concession to Hindu nationalist fears 
regarding conversions from Hinduism. Several 
recent studies have demonstrated similar levels of 
social segregation and economic exploitation among 
Muslim and Christian Dalits as among their Hindu 
counterparts.70 Despite government appointed 
commissions recommending that SC status be 
made “fully religion neutral like that of Scheduled 
Tribes,”71 this remains unlikely given the strong 
opposition of Hindu nationalists.
Despite shortcomings, the attempt to redress the 
exclusion of the SCs through reservations has 
had positive effects. The overall share of Dalits 
in government services has risen and is roughly 
proportionate to their population share. There is 
some evidence of improvement among economically 
disadvantaged rural SCs as well.72 The availability 
of avenues for government employment in the case 
of the SCs and STs appears to have encouraged the 
motivation for higher education so that outcomes 
are improving although still behind those of upper 
castes.73 However, inclusionary policies co-exist 
with increasing state repression in the case of STs, 
with violations by security forces of the basic human 
rights of local populations and activists in areas of 
Maoist insurgency and valuable natural resources.74
Muslims and the multiple sources of exclusion
Unlike SCs, Muslims do not have quotas in elected 
institutions or government services in proportion 
to their population. The 2014 national elections 
resulted in one of the lowest numbers of Muslims in 
the lower house of Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha), 
4.2% for a population estimated to be 14.2%. The 
pattern of under-representation is replicated at the 
state levels.75 In government employment, Muslim 
share is less than half their share of the population 
of the country. This, combined with low shares in 
private sector employment, make Muslims “the 
most deprived minority in the labour market.”76 In 
education, Muslims are under-represented at all 
levels, with outcomes declining as we move up the 
education ladder.77  These exclusions are reinforced 
by high levels of poverty, illiteracy, poor access to 
health amenities and segregated housing.78 In the 
frequent incidents of inter-community violence 
across the country, the collusion of the police with 
anti-Muslim mobs has been a consistent pattern, 
leading to much greater losses of Muslim lives and 
property in riots.79
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The marginalization of Muslims has persisted in 
the face of political initiatives to improve their 
status. Under the leadership of the last Indian 
prime minister Manmohan Singh (2004–14), 
a new framework was created for the inclusion 
of minorities, particularly Muslims. A Ministry 
of Minority Affairs was created in 2006, and a 
Prime Minister’s high level committee was set 
up to look into the socio-economic conditions of 
Muslims, with regard to assets, income, education, 
employment and health (Sachar Committee). 
The Prime Minister’s new 15-point program on 
minorities sought to earmark 15% benefits of a 
wide range of existing development schemes for 
members of minority communities.80 Efforts were 
made to improve the recruitment of minorities in 
government departments and in the police forces. 
In 2008–9, a new program, the largest for the 
development of minorities since Independence, 
sought to identify districts with a concentration of 
minority population and focus welfare programs 
in these districts.81 While the achievements of 
minorities in secondary and higher education 
were impressive, progress in other areas such as 
recruitment in public services remained hard to 
ascertain because of the lack of data disaggregated 
by religious community.82 And despite a bill 
for the prevention of communal violence being 
drafted, approved by Cabinet and introduced in the 
Parliament on two occasions,83 it could not be made 
into law, or even discussed. 
How do we explain the lack of impact of 
mechanisms for minority inclusion, despite the 
commitment of key government actors and the 
institution of appropriate policies? The resistance 
and tacit opposition of substantial sections within 
the bureaucracies charged with the implementation 
of these programs seems to have been a significant 
factor. Muslims have low levels of representation in 
the bureaucracy, police force and judiciary;84 this, 
combined with the influence of Hindu nationalist 
ideologies, seems to contribute to their biased 
treatment of Muslims.85 Muslims across different 
socio-economic strata expect discrimination from 
state agencies of security and justice,86 as well as 
development and welfare. State agencies have 
been unwilling to collect, disaggregate and release 
data according to religious community for most 
programs, making it impossible in many cases to 
measure the progress, or lack thereof, towards 
inclusion.87 Exclusions in one sector have knock-
on effects for others. Thus, the lack of employment 
opportunities for Muslims means that there are 
fewer incentives among Muslims to pursue higher 
education. Violence against Muslims, which has 
been rising since the 1990s, has intensified fear and 
insecurity, which in turn, has had an adverse impact 
on education and health outcomes.88
Beyond the state sector, trends in migration, 
housing and employment suggest wide-ranging 
discrimination against Muslims in society, among 
landlords, employers and service providers in the 
private sector. Direct discrimination is evident 
in recruitment to private sector jobs, as well as 
structural discrimination reflected in the increasing 
self-employment among Muslims and in their 
concentration at lower levels of the labour market.89 
In housing too, recent studies have confirmed 
reports of high levels of discrimination by private 
landlords in metropolitan cities like Delhi and 
Mumbai.90 One consequence of discrimination in 
the housing market, combined with the violence and 
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insecurity faced by Muslims, has been increasing 
spatial segregation in cities in northern and western 
India, with ghetto like spaces consolidating in cities 
with high-levels of Hindu-Muslim violence, such as 
Ahmedabad and Mumbai.91
Hindu nationalism, state power and violence
Discrimination and violence against Muslims 
is supported by Hindu nationalist ideology, 
propagated by cultural nationalist leaders and 
organizations of the Sangh parivar.92  While Hindu 
nationalist beliefs have been pervasive in society as 
a result of the educational and social work carried 
out by the RSS and its affiliates, at the national 
electoral level, Hindu nationalism achieved its 
breakthrough in the 1990s in a context marked by 
the decline of the Congress party amidst perceptions 
of corruption. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 
decision to join the movement for the construction 
of a Ram temple at Ayodhya (regarded by many 
Hindus to be the birthplace of Lord Ram) and the 
subsequent destruction of the Babri Masjid, which 
was seen as a symbol of Muslim domination, in 1992 
by Hindu activists, were key turning points.93 The 
BJP sees secularism in the Indian Constitution and 
its practice by the Congress and allied parties since 
Independence to be favoring minorities (“minority 
appeasement”) and has consistently opposed 
pluralist policies such as religious family laws and 
special status for Kashmir. Commentators have 
termed increased support for Hindu nationalism 
as a form of “elite revolt” by upper castes against 
the growing political power of lower castes.94 The 
expansion of an urban middle class seeking identity 
and power amidst the contradictory pressures of 
globalization has fuelled the growth of nationalist 
imaginaries in India, as elsewhere.95   
While some tensions remain between the ideological 
moderation required for the BJP to retain power at 
the national level and the anti-minority campaigns 
of Hindu activists, when the BJP has held state 
power, it has furthered the cause of Hindu 
nationalism. Thus, laws against cow-slaughter 
and conversions in support of Hindu normative 
food habits and attitudes towards religion have 
been enacted or strengthened by states during 
the tenure of BJP governments. The enactment of 
Hindu nationalist beliefs into law and policy has 
been accompanied by an increase in incidents of 
violence, harassment and hate speech by vigilantes 
against those suspected of eating beef or engaged 
in conversion.96 At the national level, the BJP has 
promoted the RSS’s long-term agenda in education, 
notably by installing those sympathetic to Hindu 
nationalism or compliant with it as the heads of 
educational institutions in charge of curricula. 
Thus, the previous BJP-led national government 
(1999–2004) changed the heads of several national 
institutions, suspended commissioned volumes 
by scholars critical of Hindu nationalism, sought 
to introduce courses in Vedic studies, astrology, 
palmistry “in the name of restoring ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ which… meant ‘Hindu knowledge.”’97 
A similar pattern is discernable in the case of 
the current government that has intervened 
controversially in appointments to national 
educational institutions, provoking protests from 
academics and students against the undermining 
of institutional autonomy. The Akhil Bharatiya 
Vidyarthi Parishad, the aggressive student wing of 
the party, has targeted critics of Hindu nationalism 
in universities as anti-national and, with the support 
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of Government ministers, put pressure on university 
administrations to suspend student activists, 
triggering protests in campuses across the country 
(notably the Jawaharlal Nehru University, and the 
University of Hyderabad). 
The BJP’s rise in the 1990s and its subsequent 
periods in state power have also been associated 
with increased levels of violence. One of the worst 
episodes of anti-Muslim violence in independent 
India occurred in Gujarat in 2002, when the BJP-
led state machinery allowed Hindu mobs to kill and 
loot Muslims. Studies across different cases have 
shown that the most important factor for predicting 
the level and duration of Hindu-Muslim violence 
is “the will and capacity of the government that 
controls the forces of law and order,” which in turn 
has tended to depend on electoral considerations.98 
Since the election of a BJP majority government 
in 2014, there has been an increase according to 
official data in incidents of violence and intimidation 
of religious and political minorities.99 Some 
notable examples include: members of militant 
Hindu groups burning churches; killing anti-
superstition writers; organizing campaigns against 
love-jihad (marriages or romantic relationships 
between Muslim men and Hindu women) and for 
ghar-wapsi (re-conversion to Hinduism, literally 
home-coming) among poor Christian and Muslim 
communities; lynching a Muslim butcher on the 
suspicion of consuming beef; and flogging Dalits 
transporting cow-hides. The government has 
resisted calls for strong public condemnation of 
violence against Muslims in particular; ministers 
who have made hate speeches against minorities 
remain in their posts. Instead, the government 
has appeared to support the cultural domination 
of minorities through, for instance, demoting 
public holidays associated with minorities such as 
Christmas and Easter. As a result, prejudices against 
Muslims and demeaning stereotypes (as madarsa-
going fanatics and a security threat,100 as Pakistan 
loyalists and fifth columnists) are increasingly 
voiced openly in society, encouraged by the lack of 
strong condemnation by government leaders and 
the anonymity offered by social media. 
The BJP 2014 election victory rests on narrow 
foundations (under a third of the electorate)101 and it 
relies for its electoral successes on the consolidation 
of a divided Hindu vote. As such, religious 
polarization looks set to continue, although the 
electoral defeats of the BJP in some state elections 
in 2015 (Delhi, Bihar) demonstrates support for 
counter-majoritarian forces as well.
IV. EMERGING LESSONS: 
TOWARDS A PLURALISM 
LENS
1. India’s experience suggests that societal pluralism 
can exist without inclusion as equals. Historically, in 
India, a segmented pluralism has prevailed, where 
interaction between different social segments was 
limited, and minority groups had autonomy, but 
within a hierarchical framework. In contemporary 
India, newer forms of hierarchical and segmented 
pluralism have overlaid older patterns in some 
places, and pose a challenge to inclusionary policies, 
as, for instance, in the growing residential and 
occupational segregation of Muslims in some cities. 
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2. A political order that seeks to accommodate 
societal pluralism within terms of equality needs 
a shared framework for the contestation of 
differences. The Indian Constitution (1950) was 
ahead of its time in instituting cultural rights for 
minorities and affirmative action for historically 
disadvantaged groups within a broadly liberal 
democratic framework.102 Comprising conceptions 
of democracy, secularism, social justice, 
development and national unity, the legitimating 
vocabulary of the Indian Constitution has provided 
a common framework for debate over time.103 The 
Constitution continues to be seen as exemplifying 
the enduring values of the polity by all political 
actors, and is often invoked to challenge the actions 
of governments and leaders.104 As such, the many 
forms of discrimination and violence associated 
with societal pluralism in contemporary India have 
a common framework of political values to which 
the wronged can appeal, across the communities 
and interests to which they belong. 
3. Several rounds of contentious debate and difficult 
compromises underpin the achievement of the 
Indian Constitution that was agreed to after three 
years of deliberations. Conflicting views regarding 
the recognition of differences of religion, language, 
caste and tribe, including from within the dominant 
Congress party, were expressed and publicly 
debated.105 Minorities were well represented in 
the committees and leaders of the dominant party 
tried to avoid majority-decision making, seeking 
consensus instead, sometimes delaying decisions 
to arrive at agreement. Powerful leaders conceded 
on crucial points—reservations were not the first 
preference of either Nehru or Dr. Ambedkar, but 
were accepted in the Constitution and have been 
an enduring feature of the political landscape.106 
The lengthy and public discussion of competing 
views, the willingness to compromise in order to 
achieve consensus, the limited recourse to majority 
decision-making as a last resort, contrast with the 
experience of many other post-colonial countries, as 
well as of contemporary Indian politics. 
4. India’s institutional heterogeneity in the area of 
group rights offers an example of a plural polity. 
The Indian Constitution recognizes multiple 
sources of cultural identity: religion, language 
and tribe. It also offers different routes to group 
autonomy—territorial (federalism, autonomous 
councils) as well non-territorial (religious personal 
laws). Even in relation to the same type of group, 
religious minorities, the Constitution embodies 
distinct approaches—integrationist (e.g., abolition 
of group representation) and weak multicultural 
(e.g., religious freedom including separate personal 
laws). As such, claimants for recognition and 
assistance from the state have multiple paths to 
choose from. For instance, Muslims can self-identify 
as members of a religious group in matters of family 
law, as citizens whose rights to religious freedom 
have been unjustly curtailed in a given instance, or 
members of a “backward class” for special treatment 
in education and employment in a few states. The 
Indian case suggests that state policies do not 
necessarily entrench group differences but can also 
serve to pluralize group claims.
 
5. In India, as in other countries, there is a need to 
build conceptions of national identity that are more 
inclusive of minority religions. Indian constitution-
makers articulated inclusive civic notions of national 
identity, but these were more accommodating of 
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linguistic diversity than religious diversity. While 
nationalist histories highlighting the contributions 
of leaders belonging to different communities to 
the freedom struggle were written and sought to 
be disseminated through educational curricula, 
these were received as official, state histories. 
National slogans such as “unity in diversity” did 
have popular resonance in domains such as Hindi 
cinema; however, their translation into everyday 
citizenship remained limited. By contrast, Hindu 
nationalist accounts of Indian national identity 
established a firmer hold in society, particularly 
since the 1980s. Here, the Indian nation was seen 
as fundamentally Hindu, violated for centuries by 
Islamic and Christian invaders.  Perhaps the most 
serious defect of the new Indian nation state was 
“the failure to create a liberal-pluralistic public 
rhetorical and imaginative culture whose ideas 
could have worked at the grassroots level to oppose 
those of the Hindu right.”107 The long shadow of 
the country’s partition along religious lines in 1947 
continues to limit political imagination with regard 
to the accommodation of religious diversity.
6. India offers a relatively successful example of 
multi-lingual federalism, and also shows that the 
relationship of federalism to pluralism is complex. 
With regards to sequencing, India’s experience 
suggests that while federal principles of power-
sharing need to be constitutionally entrenched, 
the delineation of the units is perhaps best left to a 
subsequent political process involving negotiation 
and compromise between political actors. Indian 
constitution-makers were wise to resist calls to 
define sub-national units in the Constitution, 
avoiding overload at the time of drafting, and 
allowing for flexibility in state boundaries. 
Subsequent accommodationist policies 
towards linguistic demands have facilitated the 
management of conflict and the resilience of the 
Indian state. At the same time, India’s experience 
also suggests, as does that of the United States 
and other countries, that the decentralization of 
power can diminish protections for minorities. 
Regional governments have often used self-
determination provisions to restrict the freedoms 
of religious, tribal and linguistic minorities. 
Several instances of violence against Muslims and 
Christians have occurred through the collusion 
of law and order agencies under the control of 
state governments. Further, greater devolution to 
states of finances and powers for the provision 
of basic goods, such as education and health, can 
increase inequalities between citizens residing in 
different regions because of differences in state 
capacity, undermining equality of opportunity for 
all citizens. More generally, India’s experience 
of federalism highlights that pluralism is a 
multi-dimensional concept, i.e., a policy that 
is pluralism-enhancing along one dimension 
(e.g., linguistic or tribal autonomy) can decrease 
pluralism along another dimension (e.g., religious 
freedom), or increase inter-group and intra-group 
inequalities.
7. Elections can have both exclusionary and 
inclusionary effects. On the one hand, Indian 
political parties have mobilized anti-minority 
sentiment during election campaigns for the 
consolidation of a Hindu majority across the 
lines of caste.108 On the other, frequent elections 
and turnover of governments has meant that no 
party or coalition is able to lay exclusive claim 
to a democratic mandate for an extended period, 
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making it harder for electoral majorities and 
group enmities to congeal for long. Furthermore, 
in seeking to build winning social coalitions, 
and to differentiate themselves in closely fought 
elections, parties and politicians have also sought 
to highlight the concerns of minorities when this 
helps them win. Political competition also has 
the potential to contain Hindu-Muslim violence, 
with state governments elected through the 
support of minority voters acting to protect and 
advance minority rights in some cases (e.g., in 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in the 1990s). As such, 
elections have not always been exclusionary, but 
also offer opportunities for politicians to act as 
entrepreneurs of inclusion. 
8. Political leadership can make a crucial 
difference to the inclusion of minorities. 
During constitution-making in the late 1940s, 
the presence of leaders such as Nehru and Dr. 
Ambedkar, who were committed to minority 
rights and held positions of executive power, 
enabled the adoption of inclusionary policies, 
despite the pressures against these after Partition. 
Between 2004–14, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan 
Singh’s commitment to improving the position of 
Muslims, supported by the Congress leadership, 
enabled a shift towards a framework that focused 
on the welfare outcomes of “socio-religious” 
communities (the term coined by the 2006 Sachar 
Commission Report). Leadership has played a 
key role at the sub-national level as well, with 
some chief ministers ensuring the protection of 
minority lives and property during periods of 
inter-religious violence, issuing unambiguous 
public statements and firm instructions that were 
followed. At the same time, while key actors can 
provide pivot points for policy shifts, elite beliefs 
and actions do not suffice to enact and implement 
measures of inclusion. A wider process is needed 
for the value of diversity to take root “in the 
minds of the decision makers at all levels,” as 
well as in the social attitudes of ordinary citizens, 
so that the “manifestation of diversity becomes 
a matter of celebration rather than a cause for 
social turmoil and political anxiety.”109 Public 
debates on diversity need to be a central part 
of such a process, both within institutions such 
as legislatures, schools and, more widely in the 
electronic and social media.
9. Correcting the exclusions of marginalized 
groups through inclusionary policies takes 
time and requires mechanisms of oversight. 
Thus, despite a policy of quotas, the under-
representation of SCs and STs continues to 
persist at the higher levels of the public services 
and, more markedly, in private sector jobs. 
As such, the adoption of an official policy 
of positive discrimination also needs to be 
supplemented with mechanisms of monitoring 
progress towards inclusion. Given the mounting 
evidence of exclusions of Muslims across a 
range of sectors, a non-discriminatory approach 
requires the consideration of mechanisms that 
have been mooted such as comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation, and an Equal 
Opportunities Commission and Diversity Index to 
offer incentives for greater inclusion of Muslims 
in educational institutions, public employment 
and private sector jobs.110 Furthermore, progress 
towards inclusionary policies requires the 
collection and release of reliable data disaggregated 
by membership of excluded groups which 
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bureaucrats have been reluctant to do, often citing its 
sensitive nature. Data disaggregated by membership 
of religious, caste, tribal and other under-represented 
groups should be required of large private sector 
employers, as well as public institutions.111
10. The protection of individual rights and 
liberties remains an important and threatened line 
of defence in the struggle to preserve pluralism in 
contemporary India. Some of the most prominent 
demands of minorities in India today pertain 
to the lack of enforcement by state agencies of 
rights to security, freedom, non-discrimination 
and equal opportunity available to all citizens, 
and of the impunity enjoyed by those who violate 
the rights of the vulnerable. In many crucial 
areas, such as physical security, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention, religious freedom, 
freedom of expression including of dissent from 
dominant views, improving protections for 
minorities requires strengthening the defence of 
individual rights. Yet, while liberal ideas have 
been influential in India, both in the thought of 
leaders, as well as the practices of movements 
and institutions, their Indian variants have rarely 
expanded on the need for constraints on state 
power for protecting individual freedom.112 The 
recent acts of violence against religious, caste 
and other minorities by vigilante groups on 
grounds of the supposed hurt to the sentiments 
of the majority further underscores the need to 
strengthen standard liberal rights, in order to 
improve protections for religious, political and 
sexual minorities in India. 
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